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Intellectual Property at the Public-Private
Divide: The Case of Large-Scale cDNA
Sequencing
REBECCA S. EISENBERG t
The Human Genome Project provides fertile ground for studying the role
of intellectual property at the wavering boundary between public and private
research science. It involves a major commitment of both public and private
research funds in an area that is of significant interest both to research
scientists working in university and government laboratories and to commercial
firms. It thus provides a wealth of new scientific discoveries that are simulta-
neously potential candidates for commercial development and inputs into
further research. Its obvious implications for human health raise the stakes of
getting the balance between private property and public access right, particular-
ly at a time when public attention is riveted upon the rising costs of health
care. It profoundly affects the interests of the young biotechnology industry as
well as the more established pharmaceutical industry, and thus offers an
opportunity to compare the perspectives of two very different types of com-
mercial firms. Moreover, intellectual property issues have been unusually
conspicuous in the recent history of advances in the emerging field of
"genomics," even by the standards of the patent-weary genetics and molecular
biology communities.
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I. EST Patent Controversy
Controversy has been particularly acute over intellectual property rights in
the results of large-scale complementary DNA (cDNA) sequencing, a technique
that focuses on the small fraction of the genome that cells "express" in the
form of proteins.1 The Human Genome Project has as its ultimate goal the
mapping and sequencing of the entire human genome.2 Yet only an estimated
three to five percent of the human genome contains the code for proteins that
cells make and use in performing their biological functions.' Through the use
of enzymes, it is possible to make copies of the coding regions within the
genome that a cell is in the process of expressing, in effect creating a heavily
redacted version of the genome that eliminates all of the "junk DNA."4 These
redacted DNA sequences are called complementary DNA ("cDNA") sequences.
Because cDNA sequences code for proteins that are used by human cells, this
approach allows for the relatively expeditious identification of DNA sequences
that are particularly likely to have medical, and perhaps commercial, signifi-
cance.
It was somewhat controversial in the early years of the Human Genome
Project whether it made sense to allocate funds to large-scale cDNA sequencing
with existing resources and technology.' One scientist who thought this
approach promising was Dr. Craig Venter of the National Institute of Neuro-
logical Diseases and Stroke.6 Working with randomly selected cDNAs derived
from human brain tissue, Dr. Venter and his colleagues used automated DNA
sequencing machines to obtain a DNA sequence for a small portion of each
cDNA.7 Each of these partial sequences, called an "expressed sequence tag"
("EST"), is long enough to supply a unique identification for the gene from
which it derives, but short enough to permit rapid partial sequencing of a
large number of genes. Any given EST can then be used as a probe to find its
corresponding full-length cDNA for further study. A database of ESTs thus
provides a catalogue of expressed genes that can serve as a useful resource in
subsequent research to identify particular genes of interest and to study their
biological functions.
ESTs quickly became the focal point for a raging controversy over intellec-
1. See Mark D. Adams, et al, Complementary DNA Sequencing: Expressed Sequence
Tags and Human Genome Project, 252 Science 1651 (1991).
2. National Research Council, Mapping and Sequencing the Human Genome 1-11
(Nat'l Academy Press 1988); United States Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,
Mapping Our Genes-The Genome Projects: How Big, How Fast? 7 (GPO 1988).
3. Adams, 252 Science at 1651 (cited in note 1).
4. See Benjamin Lewin, Genes V 640-42, 647-48 (Oxford 1994).
5. National Research Council, Mapping and Sequencing 56-60 (cited in note 2);
United States Congress, Mapping Our Genes 44 (cited in note 2).
6. See Leslie Roberts, Gambling on a Shortcut to Genome Sequencing, 252 Sci 1618
(1991); Genome Investigator Craig Venter Reflects On Turbulent Past And Future
Ambitions, Scientist 1, 10 (July 24, 1995).
7. Adams, 252 Science at 1651 (cited in note 1).
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tual property rights in the human genome. The National Institutes of Health
("NIH") set off the debate when it began filing patent applications on the first
few thousand ESTs from Dr. Venter's laboratory in 1991.' The next year Dr.
Venter and his group left NIH to form a nonprofit research organization, The
Institute for Genomic Research ("TIGR"), with generous private sector
funding.9 The same financial backers also formed a for-profit company,
Human Genome Sciences ("HGS"), to identify and develop commercial
products out of the sequence information developed by the nonprofit TIGR.0
The two organizations were soon both engaged in a massive automated cDNA
sequencing effort, creating two large, privately-held databases, of cDNA
sequence information. Meanwhile, in California, another private firm, Incyte
Pharmaceuticals, had also turned its attention to large-scale sequencing of
cDNA fragments, creating a eompeting private database." Dismayed by the
limited availability of these privately controlled databases to researchers,
within two years a major pharmaceutical firm, Merck & Co., announced its
entry into the field as sponsor of a competing cDNA sequencing effort at
Washington University, for instantaneous dedication to the public domain."
Each of these developments has been met with lively speculation about its
strategic significance from an intellectual property perspective. Are cDNA
fragments of unknown function patentable, or is further research or character-
ization necessary before they satisfy patent law standards? 4 Will patents on
8. United States patent application #07/716,831 (filed June 21, 1991). This filing set
off a storm of controversy within the scientific community. See, for example, David
Dickson, UK clinical geneticists ask for ban on the patenting of human genes, 366 Nature
391 (1993); Cesar Milstein, Patents on Scientific Discoveries Are Unfair and Potentially
Dangerous, Scientist 11 (Nov 1, 1993); Earl Lane, Debate Over Gene Patent Application:
Scientists argue NIH's claim will choke a free flow of data, Newsday 57 (May 19, 1992);
Richard Saltus, Scientists criticize NIH bid for patent on gene fragments, Boston Globe 26
(Feb 13, 1992). It also provoked opposition from trade groups representing the United
States pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. See G.J. Mossinghoff, President,
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, Letter to L.W. Sullivan, Secretary of Health and
Human Services (May 28, 1992) (on file with author); Industrial Biotechnology Associa-
tion, IBA Position Paper: Recommended Federal Policy Concerning Human Genetic
Sequences Discovered by Federal Researchers, Contractors and Grantees (June 1992) (on
file with author).
9. Gina Kolata, Biologist's Speedy Gene Method Scares Peers But Gains Backer, NY
Times C1, C10 (July 28, 1992).
10. See Human Genome Sciences, Inc., 1993 Annual Report.
11. Christopher Anderson, NIH to Appeal Patent Decision, 259 Sci 302 (1993).
12. Eliot Marshall, A Showdown Over Gene Fragments, 266 Sci 208, 208-210 (1994).
13. Patricia B. Seybold, Preparing for the knowledge economy, Chief Executive 18 (Jan
1995); David Dickson, Merck to back 'public' sequencing, 371 Nature 365 (1994); Jerry
E. Bishop, Plan May Blow Lid Off Secret Gene Research, Wall St J B1 (Sept 28, 1994).
14. See, for example, Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Genes, Patents, and Product Development,
257 Science 903 (1992); Reid G. Adler, Genome Research: Fulfilling the Public's Expecta-
tions for Knowledge and Commercialization, 257 Science 908 (1992); Thomas D. Kiley,
Patents on Random Complementary DNA Fragments?, 257 Science 915 (1992); Pamela A.
Docherty, The Human Genome: A Patenting Dilemma, 26 Akron L Rev 525 (1993); Eric
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such fragments promote commercial investment in product development,"5 or
will they interfere with scientific communication and collaboration and retard
the overall research effort?'" In the absence of patent rights, how may the
owners of private cDNA sequence databases earn a return on their investment
while still permitting other investigators to obtain access to the information on
reasonable terms? 17 What are the rights of those who contribute resources
such as cDNA libraries that are used to create the databases," and of those
who identify sequences of interest out of the morass of information in the
databases by formulating appropriate queries? 9 Will the disclosure of ESTs
in the public domain preclude patenting of subsequently characterized full-
length genes and gene products?" And why would a commercial firm invest
its own resources in generating an EST database for the public domain?2 '
Two factors have contributed to the fascination with intellectual property
issues in this setting. First, there is a perception that some pioneers in large-
scale cDNA sequencing have sought to claim intellectual property rights that
reach far beyond their actual achievements to cover future discoveries yet to be
made by other researchers. 2 For example, the controversial NIH patent
applications claimed not only the ESTs that were actually set forth in the
specifications, but also the full-length cDNAs that might be obtained by using
R. Paley, Rethinking Utility: The Expediency of Granting Patent Protection to Partial
cDNA Sequences, 44 Syracuse L Rev 1003 (1993); Daniel L. McKay, Patent Law and
Human Genome Research at the Crossroads: The Need for Congressional Action, 10 Santa
Clara Computer & High Tech L J 465 (1994); D. Benjamin Borson, The Human Genome
Projects: Patenting Human Genes and Biotechnology. Is the Human Genome Patentable?,
35 IDEA: J L & Tech 461 (1995); G. Kenneth Smith and Denise M. Kettelberger, Patents
And The Human Genome Project, 22 Amer Intell Prop L Ass'n Q J 27 (1994); Rebecca
S. Eisenberg and Robert P. Merges, Opinion Letter As To The Patentability Of Certain
Inventions Associated With The Identification Of Partial cDNA Sequences, 23 Amer Intell
Prop L Ass'n Q J 1 (1995).
15. See Adler, 257 Science at 910-11 (cited in note 14); Paley, 44 Syracuse L Rev at
1008-09 (cited in note 14).
16. Docherty, 26 Akron L Rev at 547-48 (cited in note 14); McKay, 10 Santa Clara
Computer & High Tech L J at 490 (cited in note 14); Smith and Kettelberger, 22 Amer
Intell Prop L Ass'n Q J at 47-49 (cited in note 14).
17. Borson, 35 IDEA: J L & Tech at 193-95 (cited in note 14); Eliot Marshall, HGS
Opens Its Databanks-For a Price, 266 Science 25 (1994); Marshall, 266 Science at 208
(cited in note 12); Eliot Marshall, The Company That Genome Researchers Love to Hate,
266 Science 1800 (1994).
18. Karen Young Kreeger, Legal Tussle Over cDNA Libraries May Stall Gene Sequence
Efforts, Scientist 1 (Oct 2, 1995); Karen Young Kreeger, Influential Consortium's cDNA
Clones Praised As Genome Research Time-Saver, Scientist 1 (May 15, 1995).
19. Jerry E. Bishop, Merck Discloses Details of Plan to Put Data About Genes Into
Public Domain, Wall St J B8 (Sept 29, 1994).
20. Adler, 257 Science at 910-11 (cited in note 14).
21. Seybold, Chief Executive at 18 (cited in note 13).
22. See The Human Genome Organization, HUGO Statement on Patenting of DNA
Sequences (1995); Michael S. Greenfield, Recombinant DNA Technology: A Science Strug-
gling with the Patent Law, 44 Stan L Rev 1051, 1058-59 (1992).
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the ESTs as probes, as well as smaller portions of those full-length cDNAs that
might not even include the disclosed ESTs More recently, private owners of
cDNA sequence databases have conditioned access to the databases upon
agreement in advance to offer either a license or a right of first refusal to any
resulting intellectual property rights.24 These efforts to claim rights to the
future discoveries of others raise issues about the fairness and efficiency of the
law of intellectual property in allocating rewards and incentives along the path
of cumulative innovation. These concerns are particularly compelling to
research scientists, who have more than just commercial interests at stake in
inventorship disputes.'
Second, there is a counterintuitive alignment of interests in the debate.26
It was a public institution, NIH, that initially took an aggressive position in
favor of patenting discoveries that some representatives of industry thought
should remain unpatented, and it was a private firm, Merck & Co., that
ultimately took upon itself the quasi-governmental function of sponsoring a
university-based effort to place comparable information in the public do-
main. 7 These topsy-turvy positions in the public and private sectors raise
intriguing questions about the proper roles of government and industry in
genomics research and about who stands to benefit (and who stands to lose)
from the private appropriation of genomic information. 21
II. Intellectual Property Rights in Public and Private Research
Research scientists who work in public institutions are often troubled by
the concept of intellectual property because it is counterintuitive to them to
promote progress in research through exclusive rights in prior discoveries.
Their norms tell them that science will advance most rapidly if subsequent re-
searchers enjoy free access to prior knowledge. By contrast, the working
assumption behind intellectual property law is that, without exclusive rights,
no one will be willing to invest in research and development.29
23. United States patent application #07/716,831 (cited in note 8).
24. See Marshall, 266 Science at 25 (cited in note 17); Marshall, 266 Science at 208
(cited in note 12); Marshall, 266 Science at 1800 (cited in note 17). See also The Institute
for Genomic Research, TIGR Human cDNA Database Agreements (1994) (on file with
author); The Institute for Genomic Research, Human cDNA Database User Manual (Beta
Test) (1994) (on file with author); Human Genome Sciences, Material Transfer Agreement
(1994) (on file with author).
25. See Jon Cohen, The Culture of Credit, 268 Science 1706 (1995).
26. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Technology Transfer and the Genome Project: Problems
with Patenting Research Tools, 5 Risk: Health, Safety & Environment 163 (1994);
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, A Technology Policy Perspective on the NIH Gene Patenting Con-
troversy, 55 U Pitt L Rev 633 (1994).
27. Bishop, Wall St J at B8 (cited in note 19).
28. David Dickson, 'Gene map' plan highlights dispute over public vs private interest,
371 Nature 365 (1994).
29. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Bio-
technology Research, 97 Yale L J 177, 196-97 (1987).
1996]
562 Roundtable
In a commercial setting a standard argument for recognizing intellectual
property is that inventions and discoveries are costly to make in the first place,
but cheap and easy to copy once someone else has made them. In order to
encourage firms to invest in research and development, it is necessary to give
them some means of preventing competitors from reaping the benefits of their
investment without sharing in the initial risk and cost.
One way of excluding competitors is to keep inventions secret. But secrecy
is not always feasible and may be socially undesirable. The patent system
provides an alternative strategy for protecting inventions without secrecy. A
patent gives an inventor the right to exclude others from making, using, and
selling the invention for a limited term, twenty years from the application
filing date in most of the world.3" But, in order to get a patent, the inventor
must make a full disclosure of the invention that is adequate to enable others
to make and use it.
31
Within the realm of industrial research, it is plausible that the patent
system promotes greater investment in research and development and greater
disclosure of research results than would otherwise occur. This is less clear in
the case of public sector research, which presumably need not be profitable to
be funded, and which, in the absence of patent rights, would generally be
freely disclosed rather than kept secret.
The argument for patenting public sector research discoveries is a variation
on the standard justification for patents in the commercial setting, with an
emphasis on the post-invention costs and risks involved in taking a new
discovery out of the laboratory and developing it into a successful commercial
product rather than the pre-invention costs of making the discovery in the first
place.32 The argument is that post-invention development costs typically far
exceed pre-invention research outlays and that firms would be unwilling to
make this substantial investment in product development without some
assurance of protection from competition if the product proves to be success-
ful. Patents thus facilitate the transfer of new technology to the private sector
by providing exclusive rights to preserve the profit incentives of innovating
firms.33
30. 35 USC 5 154(a)(2) (1994); European Patent Convention, Art 63(1) in Kurt
Haertel, ed, European Patent Convention: Convention on the Grant of European Patents
19, 50 (Carl Heymanns Verlag KG 1980) (Volker Vossius, trans).
31. 35 USC 5 112 (1994); European Patent Convention, Art 83 in Kurt Haertel, ed,
European Patent Convention 58 (Carl Heymanns Verlag KG 1980) (Volker Vossius, trans).
32. See Eisenberg, 5 Risk: Health, Safety & Environment at 164 (cited in note 26);
Eisenberg, 55 U Pitt L Rev at 633 (cited in note 26).
33. 1 analyze this argument at length in Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Pri-
vate Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research,
82 Va L Rev (1996) (forthcoming).
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III. Public and Private cDNA Sequencing
This argument was advanced by NIH while it was pursuing patent rights
in the first few thousand ESTs identified by Dr. Venter and his colleagues at
NIH? 4 Yet the response of the intended beneficiaries of the NIH patents-the
United States biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries-was less than
enthusiastic, suggesting that there may be some limits to the logic of promot-
ing private appropriation of the results of publicly-supported research. 5
Perhaps this was an example of the sort of research discovery that might be
more effectively exploited, even by industry, if left in the public domain. Ulti-
mately those particular sequences did enter the public domain, after the United
States Patent and Trademark Office rejected the NIH patent applications and
new leadership of NIH decided not to appeal the rejection.36
NIH did not continue to support the massive cDNA sequencing effort that
Venter and his colleagues had begun. Instead, the private sector took over the
enterprise of cDNA sequencing. In many respects this represented a step
through the looking glass for technology transfer in the Human Genome
Project and, as the situation unfolds, it becomes curiouser and curiouser.
IV. Non-Patent Strategies for Commercial Exploitation of Sequence
Databases
Although the owners of these databases are actively seeking patent protec-
tion on their sequences 7 and have obtained a few patents on sequences
encoding identified peptides with disclosed function,3 1 it remains to be seen
what, if any, patent rights they will ultimately obtain in sequences for which
they cannot yet provide such a disclosure.39 Meanwhile, the owners have been
able to exploit the databases commercially by controlling access to them, in ef-
fect using contracts and trade secrecy to protect their intellectual property.
The *viability of contract and trade secrecy as strategies for protecting the
sequence information has been limited by Merck's strategy of placing similar
information in the public domain. Other things being equal, one would expect
34. Bernadine Healy, Special Report on Gene Patenting, 327 New England J Med 664,
665 (1992); Adler, 257 Science at 910 (cited in note 14).
35. See Eisenberg, 55 U Pitt L Rev at 641-43 (cited in note 26).
36. See Christopher Anderson, NIH Drops Bid for Gene Patents, 263 Science 909
(1994).
37. See, for example, Human Genome Sciences, Inc., 1994 Annual Report ("As of
April 1, 1995, HGS had filed patent applications with the United States Patent and
Trademark office covering over 70 full-length genes and substantially all of the partial
gene sequences the Company has discovered. All of these patents are still pending.")
38. Human Genome Sciences has obtained four such patents to date. United States
patent #5,502,969 (Mar 26, 1996); United States patent #5,504,003 (Apr 2, 1996); United
States patent #5,506,133 (Apr 9, 1996); United States patent # 5,556,767 (Sept 17, 1996).
39. For an analysis of the patentability of cDNA fragments with no known function,
see Eisenberg and Merges, 23 Amer Intell Prop L Ass'n Q J 1 (cited in note 14).
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the commercial value of the private databases to decline as the information in
the public domain increases. Trade secrecy ends when information becomes
publicly available. Moreover, licensees may hesitate to sign restrictive agree-
ments to obtain access to a database if it appears that comparable information
might soon be obtained elsewhere on an unrestricted basis.
However, there are differences in the information available from the public
and private sources, differences that evidently leave the private database
owners with something to sell. Although one might expect that the window of
opportunity to sell access to the private databases would close as comparable
information becomes available in the public domain,40 commercial firms have
continued to sign up for access to the private databases even as the public do-
main database has grown.4 1
Despite the growth of the public database, the private databases remain
significantly larger.4" Inasmuch as all the information that enters the public
database promptly becomes available in the private databases as well,43 the
public database can never contain more information than the private databases.
The private database owners also claim to offer superior products in that they
have assembled contiguous fragments into longer sequences, they provide more
complete annotations for the sequences, including information about expression
in different types of tissue, they provide sequence information from customized
cDNA libraries derived from tissue types of interest to their subscribers, and
their sequence information comes with high-powered bioinformatics capabilities
and user-friendly software. Ironically, Merck's investment in enhancing the
public database may have enhanced the value of the private databases as a
resource for discovery, not only by contributing further data to make the
information in the private databases more complete,44 but also by creating a
40. See Mark S. Boguski, The turning point in genome research, 20 Trends in
Biochemical Sciences 295 (1995).
41. Charles Craig, Merck, Washington University Gene Sequence Alliance Nearing
Completion, 7 BioWorld Today 197 (Oct 9, 1996).
42. Elyse Tanouye, Gene Pioneer Opens His Databank . . . , Wall St J B1, B16 (Sept
28, 1995).
43. See Incyte Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Press Release: Incyte Launches Version 4.0 of the
LifeSeq TM Database; New Release Includes Public-Domain DNA Sequence Data (May 13,
1996).
44. In addition to augmenting the volume of available sequence information, the free
availability of the sequence information in the public database has enabled the research
community to contribute new information about the sequences, which the private database
owners may also freely incorporate into their own databases. For example, sequences in
the public database are being mapped to specific locations on chromosomes by a consor-
tium of researchers, Mark S. Boguski and Gregory D. Schuler, ESTablishing a human
transcript map, 10 Nature Genetics 369 (1995), and the mapping information is also made
promptly available in the public domain, enhancing the value of the database to research-
ers who seek to identify disease genes through positional cloning techniques. Positional
cloning refers to techniques for locating a gene responsible for disease on the basis of its
map position within the genome as determined through linkage analysis of the DNA of
members of families in which the disease is inherited. See Francis S. Collins, Positional
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deluge of information that enhances the value of the complementary propri-
etary bioinformatics capabilities that the private database owners offer to their
clients.4"
The value of the public database could be limited by the pending patent
applications of the private database owners. If these applications ripen into
issued patents, they could subsequently preempt the use of any sequences that
they cove; even if those sequences are publicly disclosed prior to issuance of
the patents, so long as the patent applicants are able to establish their priority.
Because United States patent applications are maintained in confidence until a
patent is issued," it is impossible to determine at this stage what sequences
have been the subject of patent applications. There are also significant legal
questions about which if any of the sequences will qualify for patent protec-
tion. 7 Those who make use of sequences that are placed in the public data-
base today thus risk facing a future injunction if those sequences turn out to
be patented by HGS or Incyte on the basis of previously filed patent applica-
tions. Of course, the same uncertainty applies to sequences obtained from the
private databases-a sequence obtained by an Incyte database subscriber might
turn out to be covered by a previously filed HGS patent, for example. But
because the Merck initiative got off to a late start, its sequences are particular-
ly likely to be covered by prior patent applications from the other firms.
V. Exclusive Licensing, Nonexclusive Licensing, and the Public
Domain
Meanwhile, in the absence of issued patents, the private database owners
may be able to leverage their control over access to the databases today into
a valuable proprietary position in subsequent research discoveries tomorrow.
The actions of HGS, Incyte, and Merck show three distinct models of how to
exploit unpatented information: exclusive licensing, nonexclusive licensing, and
dedication to the public domain. Since each of these approaches comes out of
the private sector; we can assume that each firm believes, rightly or wrongly,
that its strategy will maximize the value it obtains from the information. The
strategies are quite different, yet they are interdependent, and it is still too
early to tell how each will pay off. But we can see where different firms are
placing their bets and we also have some idea of the size of those bets.
cloning moves from perditional to traditional, 9 Nature Genetics 347 (1995). For an
explanation of how genetic-linkage maps are created, see Robert Mullan Cook-Deegan,
Mapping the Human Genome, 65 S Cal L Rev 579 (1991).
45. See Eliot Marshall, Hot Property: Biologists Who Compute; Corporate Demand for
Bioinformatics Experts, 272 Science 1730 (1996); Advertising Supplement, DNA Sequencing
Software: Balancing Sensitivity, Speed, Flexibility, and Ease of Use, 272 Sci 1509 (1996).
46. 35 USC S 122 (1994).
47. See Eisenberg and Merges, 23 Amer Intell Prop L Assn Q J at 3-20 (cited in note
1996]
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A. EXCLUSIVE LICENSING
The HGS strategy, at least as initially pursued, approximates an exclusive
licensing model. In 1993, HGS entered into a Collaboration Agreement with
SmithKline Beecham ("SB")48 giving SB exclusive rights to develop and market
protein therapeutic products and diagnostic products out of the information in
the database, plus an equity position in HGS, in exchange for payments totaling
$125 million, plus royalties on product sales.49 The agreement did not cover
gene therapy or anti-sense products; HGS has entered into separate collaborative
agreements with other research partners for the development of products in these
areas10 Moreover, during the period of SB's exclusive license, outside investi-
gators have been able to obtain access to the HGS database by signing a "Mate-
rial Transfer Agreement" granting "a sole and exclusive worldwide right and
license" to HGS to develop any resulting products on terms to be negotiated in
the future.sl
An obvious advantage of this exclusive licensing strategy, at least from the
perspective of HGS, is that it generated considerable revenue-SB placed what
looked at the time to be a very large bet. An obvious concern with the exclusive
licensing approach is that restricting access to the database to such a degree
could limit the amount of value that is extracted from the information during the
term of the exclusive license. There is only so much information that a single
firm and its small circle of collaborators can use or even evaluate in a finite time
period.
More recently, HGS and SB have departed from their original exclusive
licensing strategy in favor of allowing more firms to tap into the database. 2
Within the past year, HGS and SB have entered into collaborative agreements to
allow four additional pharmaceutical firms-Takeda Chemical Industries,"
Merck KGaA (not related to Merck & Co.),54 Schering Plough" and
48. A version of this agreement with certain confidential terms omitted was placed on
file with the Securities and Exchange Commission as an exhibit to the prospectus for
HGS's initial public offering of common stock in 1993 and is on file with the author.
49. Human Genome Sciences, Inc., 1993 Annual Report at 13; SmithKline Beecham
PLC, 1994 Annual Report and Accounts 8.
50. Human Genome Sciences, Inc., 1994 Annual Report at 1.
51. See, for example, Human Genome Sciences and the University of Michigan, Ma-
terial Transfer Agreement at $ 14 (Sept 14, 1994) (on file with author).
52. Human Genome Sciences and SmithKline Beecham, Press Release: Human Genome
Sciences and SmithKline Beecham Sign Revised Genomics Collaboration Agreement (July
2, 1996).
53. See Takeda to access gene information, Biotechnology Newswatch 13 (Sept 18,
1995).
54. PR Newswire, Human Genome Sciences, SmithKline Beecham, and Merck KGaA
Sign Genomics Collaboration Agreement (July 16, 1996) (available in LEXIS, News library,
Wires file).
55. PR Newswire, Schering-Plough, Human Genome Sciences and SmithKline Beecham
Sign Genomics Collaboration Agreement, (July 2, 1996) (available in LEXIS, News library,
Wires file).
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Synthelabo SA---to share access to the database, evaluate the information, and
develop related products. These new collaborators will make total payments of
at least $140 million to HGS and SB, 7 not including milestone payments and
royalties. In addition to bringing in new revenue, it is likely that these new
agreements will increase the amount that is learned from the database by
expanding the universe of investigators who are able to make queries.
Some of the sequences in the HGS database were obtained by its nonprofit
affiliate, TIGR, under the terms of agreements giving HGS intellectual property
rights in TIGR discoveries. These agreements permitted TIGR to publish its DNA
sequences after specified time periods following disclosure to HGS. Pursuant to
these retained rights, TIGR established a separate database, TIGR Human cDNA
Database ("HCD"), to be made available to investigators in academic and non-
profit institutions under "Database Access Agreements" with less restrictive
terms than those provided in the HGS Material Transfer Agreement."8 The
TIGR HCD initially included most of the TIGR-generated sequences along with
those HGS sequences that corresponded to sequences that had already been
disclosed by others in a public database. The terms of access for unpublished
sequences are more restricted than for published sequences, requiring that the
investigator's institution first sign a "Database Option Agreement" granting HGS
"a sole and exclusive option to obtain a sole and exclusive or a nonexclusive
worldwide royalty bearing license" to resulting products. 9 Sequences that have
been disclosed or partially disclosed in a public database are available on less
restricted terms,6" but initially even for these sequences investigators were
limited to a specified number of queries that could be recorded, stored, and
monitored by the Database Manager. No outside investigators could trawl
through the database or manipulate its contents at will and commercial investiga-
tors could not obtain access to the database at all. As the information available
in public databases has expanded, a larger portion of the TIGR HCD has
become available on less restricted terms and TIGR has recently announced its
intention to make the entire database freely available on the World Wide Web as
56. PR Newswire, SmithKline Beecham and Human Genome Sciences Sign Genomics
Collaboration Agreement with Synthelabo, (July 2, 1996) (available in LEXIS, News
library, Wires file).
57. Schering-Plough agreed to pay $55 million, PR Newswire, Schering-Plough (cited
in note 5), Merck KGaA agreed to pay $50 million, PR Newswire, Human Genome
Sciences (cited in note 54), and Synthelabo agreed to pay $35 million, PR Newswire,
SmithKline Beecham (cited in note 56). The payments called for in the agreement with
Takeda were not disclosed.
58. The terms of access are described by TIGR on the World Wide Web at
http://www.tigr.orgtdb/hcd.html#new ("TIGR Web Page").
59. Institute for Genomic Research, TIGR Human cDNA Database Agreements: Human
cDNA Database Level II Access Agreement 1 1.2 (1994); Institute for Genomic Research,
TIGR Human cDNA Database Agreements: Database Option Agreement 2.1 (1994).
60. Institute for Genomic Research, TIGR Human cDNA Database Agreements: Level
I Access Agreement 3 (1994); Institute for Genomic Research, Human cDNA Database
User Manual (Beta Test) at 3.2 (cited in note 24).
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of April 17, 1997.61
B. NONEXCLUSIVE LICENSING
Incyte pursued a nonexclusive licensing approach for access to its proprietary
LifeSeq Tm database from the outset, offering database subscription agreements to
as many firms as will take them, at a considerably cheaper price than the $125
million SB paid for its deal with HGS. So far eleven firms have signed up in
agreements with varying terms.62 Pfizer and Upjohn each signed agreements
involving payments in the range of $20 million to $25 million, including
amounts paid for the purchase of Incyte stock, plus royalties on product sales.63
Novo Nordisk and Hoechst have signed similar agreements on undisclosed
financial terms." In December 1995, Incyte announced that it had signed a da-
tabase agreement with Abbott Laboratories that it characterized in a press release
as "the largest financial commitment by a subscriber to date," although again the
specific financial terms were not disclosed." When Incyte announced its sixth
subscriber, Johnson & Johnson, in January 1996, the accompanying press release
claimed that the six subscribers will provide in the aggregate a minimum of $100
million toward the development of Incyte's proprietary genomic databases,
excluding contingent payments such as milestones and product royalties." Since
that announcement, Incyte has entered into additional agreements with
Hoffmann-La Roche,67 Zeneca," BASF AG, 9 Schering AG, Berlin," and Eli
Lilly.7 Incyte's subscribers have each placed smaller individual bets than SB did,
61. See TIGR Web Page (cited in note 58).
62. Comparison of the terms of the different agreements is complicated by the fact that
some of the agreements involve the creation of satellite databases of sequences expressed
in different tissue samples of particular interest to the subscriber, and some involve access
to other database products, including the LifeSeq Tm database of full-length genes and
PathoSeqTm database of microbial DNA sequences.
63. Incyte Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 1994 Form 10-K.
64. Incyte Signs Database Deal With Novo Nordisk, Marketlerter (Sept 4, 1995);
Incyte Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Press Release: Incyte and Hoechst Sign Lifeseqm Database
Access Agreement (Dec 20, 1995).
65. Incyte Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Press Release: Incyte and Abbott Sign Genomic
Database Subscription Agreement: Agreement to Include Microbial Genomes (Jan 2, 1996).
The agreement with Abbott Laboratories includes payment for sequencing microbial
genomes, which may explain why it represents the largest financial commitment by a
subscriber to date.
66. Incyte Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Press Release: Incyte and Johnson & Johnson Sign
Genomic Database Subscription Agreement (Jan 2, 1996).
67. Incyte Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Press Release: Incyte and Roche Sign Genomic
Database Agreement (Apr 18, 1996).
68. Incyte Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Press Release: Incyte Signs Eighth Genomic Database
Agreement with Zeneca (June 17, 1996).
69. Incyte Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Press Release: Incyte and BASF AG Sign Genomic
Database Agreement (June 27, 1996).
70. Incyte Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Press Release: Incyte and Scbering AG Sign Genomic
Database Agreement (July 8, 1996).
71. Incyte Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Press Release: Incyte and Lilly Enter Into Genomic
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but there are considerably more of them, and it is quite possible that Incyte's
nonexclusive licensing strategy has already generated more revenue for the data-
base owner than HGS's exclusive licensing strategy. One might have expected
Incyte's window of opportunity to sign up new subscribers to close as the
Merck-sponsored sequencing effort at Washington University expanded the com-
peting public database, yet all but the first of Incyte's subscribers signed up after
Merck announced its competing effort. The most recent subscriber signed up
even as the Merck-sponsored effort approached completion.'
From a broader social standpoint the more interesting question is not the
size of the bets but the ultimate payoffs. Which approach will yield more
discoveries or more commercial products? Although the nonexclusive strategy
seems more likely to take advantage of the different capabilities of different
firms, a drawback of the Incyte approach is that the company has not yet figured
out a way to make its database directly available to academic investigators with-
out undermining its value to Incyte's corporate subscribers. Academic investiga-
tors may only obtain access to the Incyte database by collaborating with a
corporate database subscriber
C. PUBLIC DOMAIN
The Merck strategy of putting cDNA sequence information in the public
domain is, at least at first glance, the most puzzling from a strategic standpoint.
Rather than creating its own proprietary database or subscribing to another
firm's database, Merck has chosen to finance a human cDNA sequencing project
at the Genome Sequencing Center at Washington University to create the Merck
Gene Index as a public resource.7' The results of this sequencing effort are
deposited daily in databases that are freely accessible to the public, without any
delays in disclosure to secure patent rights or even advance access by Merck's
own researchers. 4 It is easy to justify such a move rhetorically as a public-spir-
ited contribution to the larger research enterprise,' but it is nonetheless worth
considering how this strategy might advance Merck's own commercial interests.
One advantage to Merck of putting the information in the public domain is
that it allows it to generate the information more cheaply-indeed, almost
unbelievably cheaply. Merck has placed a relatively small bet, reportedly some-
Database Partnership (Dec 18, 1996).
72. See notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
73. See Merck & Co., Inc., Press Release: First Installment of Merck Gene Index Data
Released to Public Databases; Cooperative Effort Promises to Speed Scientific Understand-
ing of the Human Genome (Feb 10, 1995).
74. Id at 2.
75. See, for example, Merck & Co., Inc., Press Release: Merck to Make Compre-
hensive Database of Genetic Information Publicly Available (Sept 28, 1994) ("The Merck
Gene Index is the latest example of Merck's century-long commitment to providing
comprehensive and authoritative scientific and medical information as a public service on
a not-for-profit basis.").
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where under $10 million.7' This is a fraction of the amounts spent by non-
exclusive subscribers for access to Incyte's database, and a tiny fraction of the
amount spent by SB for its exclusive deal with HGS. By positioning itself as a
public benefactor, Merck is able to make use of the capabilities of the Genome
Sequencing Center at Washington University,17 in effect benefiting from the
experience and facilities of a group that has received considerable public funding.
Merck has also been able to obtain access at nominal cost to research materi-
als7" that, in all likelihood, it would have had to pay a premium for if it were
trying to assemble a private database. The cheap price tag for generating the
information also suggests that Merck may not be giving up that much from a
competitive standpoint by foregoing the opportunity to retain it as a proprietary
resource; Merck's competitors could presumably create a comparable resource
within the same price range.
Apart from generating the sequence information more cheaply, Merck claims
that it expects to derive more benefit from the information by distributing it
widely." As Merck representatives explain,8" the sequence information will not
yield products for commercial development until further fundamental biological
research is done to understand the functions and biological pathways associated
with the partially sequenced genes. Merck's comparative advantage does not lie
in performing this fundamental research, but rather in developing specific drugs
at a later stage in the research and development process. By promptly placing the
sequence information in the public domain, and thereby making it widely
available to academic researchers, Merck anticipates benefiting in the long run
from the fundamental research of those who use the database. Nothing obligates
these researchers to bring any potential products to Merck for commercial de-
velopment, but Merck is confident that its capabilities and resources will allow
it to capture an adequate share of resulting products to justify its modest
investment in generating the database. In other words, Merck expects to profit
more in absolute terms by making the database publicly available, even if other
firms also profit as a result.
Some observers have suggested a more cynical possibility-that Merck seeks
to undermine the value of investments already made in existing sequence data-
bases by its commercial competitors.8 Putting the information in the public
domain leaves HGS and Incyte (and their collaborators) dependent on patent
rights to protect their proprietary positions in the long run, and Merck may be
76. Dickson, 371 Nature at 365 (cited in note 28).
77. The accomplishments of the Genome Sequencing Center are summarized on the
World Wide Web at http://genome.wustl.edu/gsc/gschmpg.html.
78. Columbia Univ. Donates cDNA Libraries to Public Database; "Normalization"
Facilitates Sequencing, 38 Blue Sheet No. 17 at 8-9 (Apr 26, 1995).
79. John Carey, et al, The Gene Kings: Two scientists are changing how DNA is
mined-and drugs are discovered, Business Week 72, 73 (May 8, 1995).
80. The discussion in the text is based in part on telephone conversations with Bennett
Shapiro (Oct 17, 1994) and Alan Williamson (Nov 11, 1994).
81. Carey, et al, Business Week at 73 (cited in note 79).
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betting that they will not obtain much in the way of patent rights. Merck's own
strategy for making money does not rely on maintaining a proprietary position
in cDNA sequences and therefore it has little to lose, and possibly something to
gain, by putting such sequences in the public domain. Merck does not have any
therapeutic protein or DNA diagnostic products that might require proprietary
rights in DNA sequences to be commercially viable. Its proprietary rights in small
molecules that it hopes to sell as pharmaceutical products are far more signifi-
cant to its commercial position than proprietary rights in DNA sequences. This
distinction highlights the very different ways in which the sequence information
is valued by Merck on one hand and HGS and Incyte on the other. From
Merck's perspective, cDNA sequences are research tools for use in drug discov-
ery, not products for sale to consumers. For HGS and Incyte, cDNA sequences
are themselves a product in that they supply an immediate source of revenue.
As the Merck Gene Index neared its scheduled completion date at the end of
1996,"2 it did not in fact appear to have undermined the commercial value of
the HGS and Incyte databases. Quite the contrary, since Merck announced its
plan, Incyte has signed up ten new subscribers and HGS and SB have entered
into collaborations with four additional firms. 3 Obviously, the private database
owners still have something valuable to offer Merck's competitors.
Apart from its impact on the profit expectations of private database owners
and their collaborators, the information in the Merck Gene Index may have
considerable social value if other firms and publicly-funded researchers put the
information to use. Will the nonproprietary character of the information lead
commercial firms to shun the data for fear of being unable to exclude competi-
tors from the market for any resulting products or will the public database be
actively and widely exploited? Accessions to the public database GenBank have
shown a dramatic increase since the Merck data started coming on line.84 A big
part of the increase has come in the form of anonymous file transfer protocol
("FTP") downloads of the entire database,"5 a form of query that is likely to be
popular with commercial users who do not want to risk tipping their hands to
competitors by leaving an electronic record of what it is they are looking for.
VI. The Public Domain and the Public-Private Divide
These three different approaches highlight striking differences in the interests
of different firms in proprietary rights in the human genome. HGS and Incyte
may benefit from a strategy that promotes the private appropriation of DNA
sequences; Merck may benefit from a strategy that puts these sequences in the
public domain: One firm's research tool may be another firm's end product. Yet
in an important sense, the fact that Merck chooses to put cDNA sequences in the
82. Craig, 7 BioWorld Today at 197 (cited in note 41).
83. See notes 53-57 and 63-71 and accompanying text.
84. Boguski, 20 Trends in Biochemical Sciences at 295-96 (cited in note 40).
85. Telephone conversation with Mark Boguski at the National Center for Bio-
technology Information (Aug 1, 1995).
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public domain is more instructive than the fact that HGS and Incyte choose to
appropriate them as private property. Whenever new property rights come into
view, someone will step forward to claim them, and it is unsurprising to hear the
claimants tell a story about how private ownership will enhance the public
welfare. It is more uncommon for a private firm to disclaim proprietary rights in
the information it generates and to sing the praises of the public domain.
The Merck initiative raises fundamental questions about the boundaries
between public and private in research science and product development. In an
earlier era, we could have given a coherent account of these boundaries in
theory, however blurred they may have been in practice. Public research tended
to focus on the pursuit of fundamental knowledge of a character that was not
readily appropriable by a private owner, and it was generally believed that such
knowledge would have the greatest social value if it was widely distributed with
no restrictions on its use. Private research, by contrast, tended to focus on
narrower applications of scientific principles that were readily appropriable by
innovating firms. These firms required proprietary rights to protect them from
competition and to make their investments in research and development profit-
able. Publicly supported research was presumptively placed in the public domain,
while privately supported research was typically appropriated as intellectual
property.
Today, these boundaries are more difficult to maintain, particularly in fields
of such obvious commercial interest as genetics. Researchers in the public and
private sectors have often found themselves working on the same problems,
whether competitively or collaboratively, and the prevailing wisdom is that
institutions performing publicly-sponsored research should patent their discover-
ies whenever it is profitable to do so. In this environment we lack a clear story
about when it makes sense for the public to sponsor research and when it makes
sense to dedicate new knowledge to the public domain.
When public policy promotes private appropriation of research results as
intellectual property even when they emerge from public sector research, it is
easy to lose sight of the public and private benefits of disseminating information
in the public domain. The most obvious of these benefits are that free availability
encourages widespread use of information and minimizes transaction costs.
Travel on a freeway is both cheaper and faster than travel on a tollway with
numerous tollbooths. Similarly, research and development is cheaper and faster
if it uses resources that are freely available than it is if the road to product
development requires frequent stops to negotiate licenses for access to prior
discoveries. Free roadways can also enhance the value of private property by
making it more readily accessible. Thus free dissemination of information on the
Internet helps firms attract customers. Of particular relevance to research science,
a vigorous public domain can supply a meeting place for people, information,
and ideas that might not cross paths in the course of more organized, licensed
encounters. And finally, of particular relevance to fields of research that draw
heavily upon work that is done in the public sector and the academy, informa-
tion in the public domain is accessible to relatively impecunious users who would
otherwise be priced out of the market. Thus, for example, if academic research-
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ers are particularly important to the progress of research in a field, as Merck
evidently believes they are for understanding the human genome, then the overall
research enterprise could be significantly retarded by property rights that restrict
their access to essential resources and information.
If ESTs in fact have more social value in the public domain than in the hands
of private owners, perhaps government research sponsors should have taken
upon themselves the burden of supplying this resource to the public rather than
leaving it to the private sector On the other hand, perhaps the extent of private
sector interest in supporting large-scale cDNA sequencing indicates that this
work does not require government funding and that public resources would be
better spent on other projects. The Merck initiative invites the optimistic conclu-
sion that there are limits to how far the government can go wrong-that if the
stakes are high enough, someone in the private sector may find it worthwhile to
correct for any errors in judgment on the part of the government and maybe
even to pick up the tab.
Yet it would be foolish to conclude on the basis of this extraordinary
episode that we can rely on the private sector to create a public domain whenev-
er that is the most efficient way to exploit new information from a broader
social perspective. Perhaps a better lesson to draw is that we may have underesti-
mated the value of a rich public domain to the private sector as well as to the
public sector, and that we may need to reconsider the limits of private appropria-
tion of new information as a means of promoting commercial development.
19961

